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RECENT CASES
INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION-ENFORCEMENT OF CALIFORNIA
NON-RESIDENT ALIEN INHERITANCE STATUTE-EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL
POWER OVER THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
. Claimant, a citizen and resident of East Germany, was the
sole heir of the deceased, a California resident and naturalized citi-
zen of the United States. California, under the reciprocity' and
escheat2 provisions of its Probate Code, contended that claimant
could not claim the right of intestate succession and therefore the
decedent's real and personal property must escheat to the State.
Claimant countered with the argument that section 259 of the Pro-
bate Code conflicted with provisions in the United States' 1923 treaty
with Germany 3 and constituted an invasion by California into an
area of foreign affairs, exclusively a federal field.
The fact that the United States and Germany had executed a
treaty in 1923 would have been dispositive of the issue in this case
except for the fact that the reciprocal rights secured by the treaty
involved realty but not personalty. In as much as the decedent's
estate consisted of both real and personal property it was neces-
sary for the court to determine the validity of the reciprocity stat-
tute without use of an express federal supremacy concept.
The California Court of Appeal, Second District, affirming the
Superior Court's decision, held that section 259 of the Probate Code
was an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs. There-
fore, the petitioner, as sole heir, was entitled to full distribution of
the decedent's estate with California notwithstanding the fact that
she was a non-resident alien. In re Estate of Kraemer, 81 Cal. Rptr.
287 (1969).
1. CAL. PROs. CODE § 259 (West 1956): "The right of aliens not residing within the
United States . . . to take real property in this State by succession or testamentary dis-
position, upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United
States is dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of
citizens of the United States to take real property upon the same terms and conditions
as residents and citizens of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents
and the right of aliens not residing in the United States . . . to take personal property
. Is dependent . . . upon the existence of a reciprocal right .... "
2. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.2 (West 1956): "If such reciprocal rights are not found
to exist and if no heirs other than such aliens are found eligible to take such property.
the property shall be disposed of as escheated property."
3. Treaty with Germany Dec. 8, 1923, art. IV, 44 Stat. 2132 (1925).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Under the common law an alien could inherit personalty but
not realty.4 This disability upon aliens has been altered by state sta-
tutes.5 The basic premise is that a state has the power and right
to regulate property distribution by testamentary or intestate suc-
cession within its jurisdiction. 6 If there is conflict between a
state statute and federal legislation or treaty, then the state sta-
tute becomes invalid.7 Thus, a most common method of attack by
the non-resident alien has been the argument that such statutes
constitute intrusion into foreign affairs by the state.8
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Experience has shown that international controversies of the
gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise
from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted,
or permitted, by a government. 9
This statement indicates that any action which affects an alien may
involve delicate foreign relations problems. However, in a memoran-
dum for the United States as amicus curiae in Zschernig v. Miller"0
the State Department informed the Court that state alien inheri-
tance laws have had little effect on the foreign relations of this
country.:" One writer has stated that there is little direct evidence
regarding this question.1
2
The so-called reciprocity statutes that have been enacted by
some states' s provide that a non-resident alien, who is entitled to
receive property within the borders of the subject state, must meet
the burden of proving that a citizen of the United States would be
able to take property upon the same terms and conditions as could
residents of the particular foreign country under consideration."1
Under an analysis of the instant case the non-resident alien claim-
ant. has no burden at all, because the only evidence allowed is a
reading by the court of the foreign law relating to reciprocity. 15
Therefore, statutes placing the burden upon the claimant to show
that reciprocity does exist are meaningless unless it can be sur-
mised that state courts will be permitted to carry their investiga-
tion slightly beyond a reading of the foreign law. If this is not the
46 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372; 2 J. KIENT, COMMENTAR S 61-63.
6. 13 ViLL. L. REv. 672, 674 (1968).
6. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942)
United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876).
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI; In re Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 438 (1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953).
8. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
9. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1951).
101. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
11. Id. at 434.
12. 21 VAND. L. REv. 502, 511 (1968).
13. E.g., CAL. PROS. CODE § 259 (West 1956); IowA CODE ANN. 567.8 (Supp. 1970);
MONT. Rev. CODES ANN. § 91-520 (1964) ; NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 134.230-250 (1957) ; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 64-3 to -5 (1965).
14. Id.
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case then that section of a statute placing the burden upon the claim-
ant to prove the existence of reciprocity should have been de-
clared unconstitutional on its face.
Clark v. Allen 16 established that a general reciprocity clause
in a state statute did not, on its face, intrude federal domain and
therefore such a statute was presumed constitutional. It should be
pointed out that the Supreme Court was not concerned with the
manner of application of the subject statute. It was stated that the
reciprocity statute in question had only incidental or indirect ef-
fect in foreign countries and that many state statutes did this.1
Considerable doubt on the present vitality of the Clark holding was
cast in Zschernig v. Miller,18 where the court held that a recipro-
city and benefit statute19 was an invalid intrusion by the state into
the field of foreign affairs as applied by the court notwithstanding
that the statute did not conflict with express federal policy. 20 In
deciding Zschernig the court refused to re-examine its decision in
Clark, holding that the state reciprocity statute was not invalid on
its face but was invalid as applied. 21 Of course, this leaves some
uncertainty as to under what circumstances a state statute does
affect foreign relations in this area. Justices Stewart and Brennan,
in concurring, opinioned that the statute was invalid on its face as
contrary to the Federal Constitution and along with Justice Har-
lan advocated overturning Clark.
22
The California court in the instant case followed the directions
set down by the Zschernig holding. The reciprocity statute 23 in the
Zschernig case was in essence a replica of section 259 of the Cali-
fornia Probate Code. Therefore, both provisons allegedly have vi-
tality and are valid on their face. The difficulty arises when the
probate court attempts to ascertain whether reciprocity does in
fact exist in the subject foreign country. According to the holdings
in Clark v. Allen, Zschernig v. Miller and the instant case the reci-
procity or benefit type statute becomes invalid when the state
court's inquiry goes beyond the mere reading of the relevant foreign
law.
24
Several previous decisions pertaining to the issue indicate that
state courts have ventured beyond a mere reading of the foreign
country's statute. Legatees who were residents and citizens of
15. Zschernlg v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433 (1968).
16. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
17. Id. at 517.
18. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
19. ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (Supp. 1957) (repealed by 1969 C. 59 1 306).
20. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968).
21. Id. at 432.
22. Id. at 441-42.
23. ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (Supp. 1957) (repealed by 1969 c. 59 § 305).
24. Zschernlg v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1968).
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Czechoslovakia failed to establish their right to take under an Ore-
gon reciprocity statute notwithstanding the offering of a certificate
from that country's Ambassador declaring that United States heirs
in Czechoslovakia did receive by succession without discrimination.
The court's rationale in deciding against the claimants was that
little credence could be given to statements of Czechoslovakian of-
ficials because of their interest in acquiring funds for their govern-
ment. Judicial notice was taken regarding the fact that communists
were not known for their veracity.
25
Soviet Union beneficiaries have, on some occasions, been unable
to establish the existence of reciprocity necessary to satisfy the Cali-
fornia statute. In one case the court examined the Russian govern-
mental structure, constitution, court system and its general legal
theory and held that no reciprocal rights existed.
26
Illustrative of the fact that existing political climate can in-
fluence a state court's determination as to whether a non-resident
alien can qualify as a beneficiary is a decision just five years after
the aforementioned case. A Russian citizen was allowed to receive
property by testamentary disposition from a California decedent. The
court stated that despite its reactions to Soviet Union policies, resolu-
tion of foreign policy questions must rest with the Federal Govern-
ment. The court was concerned that section 259 of the California
Probate Code might be declared unconstitutional if the state inquired
too deeply into Russian policy. It is interesting to note that the
court did receive testimony from an expert and from documents
tending to show that United States citizens who were beneficiaries
of estates in the Soviet Union suffered no discrimination. 27 This in
itself was an inquiry by the court beyond a mere reading of the
foreign law.
In a surprising turnabout, the Supreme Court of California
while hearing an estate claimant who was a citizen of Rumania, de-
termined, after reading the Rumanian law on succession, that re-
ciprocity did not exist. The court ventured beyond a reading of the
law and examined the actual practice in Rumania regarding mat-
ters of inheritance involving United States citizens and determined
that the claimants met their burden of showing that economically
significant reciprocity did exist. The trial court heard authorities
on Rumanian law testify and examined articles and case histories
in ascertaining the reciprocity question. The authority was asked,
"Do you know of any situation under the law of Rumania where a
Rumanian citizen might inherit property but under the same cir-
cumstances the courts of Rumania would not permit a citizen of the
25. State v. Pekarek, 234 Ore. 74, 378 P.2d 734, 738 (1963).
26. In re Gogabashvele's Estate, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (1961).
27. In re Estate of Larkin, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 416 P.2d 473 (1966).
RECENT CASES
United States to inherit the same property?" The authority an-
swered, "No I don't. Rumanian tribunals, as a matter of fact, can-
not make any discrimination in this respect. ... -2" The question
arises, what if the authority had answered in the affirmative to
the question of whether discrimination against United States citi-
zens existed?
The underlying motive behind a benefit or reciprocity type of
statute appears to be an attempt to encourage foreign nations to
grant inheritance rights to United States citizens. 29 Just prior to
World War II the fear of confiscatory policies by Nazi Germany led
a New York court to refuse to distribute property to a German-
Jewish beneficiary of an American estate. 30 This type of political
consideration continued to influence state courts during the Cold
War. Statements by judges, and others, expressed some state
court attitudes:
.... sending American money to a person within the borders
of an Iron Curtain country is like sending a basket of feed
to Little Red Ridinghood in care of her 'grandmother'. 3 1
It is conceded that there is no right to inherit land, since it
is a primary principle of their [Soviet] form of govern-
ment that real property is owned by the State.
82
If this money were turned over to the Russian authorities,
it would be used to kill our boys and innocent people in South-
east Asia ... 3
Now, as then, it is recognized as elementary that to per-
mit goods and dollars to flow into the countries controlled
by the aggressor is against our national interest.
8 4
The court found Russia had no separation of powers, too
much control in the hands of the Communist Party, no in-
dependent judiciary, confused legislation, unpublished sta-
tutes . . . the court also noted Stalin's crimes, the Beria
trial, the doctrine of crime by analogy . . .5
I'm a bigoted anti-Communist. 6
Illustrative of a state statute reflecting international tensions
is California's during the 1940's. Prior to 1945 the burden was upon
the non-resident alien claimant to establish that reciprocity did
exist.8 7 This was amended in 1945 (reflecting amiable American and
28. In re Estate of Chichernea, 57 Cal. Rptr. 135, 140, 424 P.2d 687, 692 (1967).
29. Clostermann v. Schmidt, 215 Ore. 55, 332 P.2d 1036, 1042 (1958).
30. In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
31. In re Belemeeich's Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 511, 192 A.2d 740, 742 (1963).
32. In re Bold's Estate, 173 Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S.2d 291, 295 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
33. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1954, at 25, col. 7.
34. Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its SateNites to Share in Estates
of American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. Rav. 297 (1952).
35. 55 CAL. L. R1v. 592, 594 n. 10 (1967).
36. Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. Rev. 257 (1962).
37. Ch. 895, § 1, [1941] Cal. Stats. 2473.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Russian relations) to a presumption in favor of reciprocity 8 and in
1947 (when Cold War tensions mounted) a reversion back to the
burden resting with the claimant.39
It is not clear from the opinion in the case under discussion
whether the reciprocity requirement of section 259 of the California
Probate Code in and of itself constitutes an intrusion into the field
of foreign affairs, or whether said section when read against the
United States' 1923 Treaty with Germany makes the reciprocity re-
quirement invalid. In addition, the case fails to enumerate just what
action by probate courts in administering reciprocity clauses con-
stitute inquiry into foreign affairs. The decision appears to rest on
an historical basis in that the opinion discusses how some state
courts have, in the past, interjected their own bias when con-
fronted with the reciprocity issue rather than holding to just a read-
ing of the relevant foreign law. The Kraemer court relied heavily
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Zschernig but
Justice Douglas also failed to offer a clear definition of where the
boundary line between exclusive federal domain and legitimate state
inquiry should be drawn.
TOM ALLISON
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE OF COMMUN-
ICATION TO OR INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY PHYSICIAN-Appel-
lee suffered severe back injuries as a result of an automobile
accident due to the alleged negligence of the appellant. In the per-
sonal injury action that followed, appellee introduced testimony by
several expert witnesses to prove that his injuries and damages
were a result of the automobile accident. The appellant called Dr.
George Holiday, the chiropractor who had treated appellee prior
to the accident, to testify. The appellee objected to this testimony,
asserting that it violated the statutorily protected confidential com-
munication between physician and patient, and that at no time
had there been a waiver of this privilege.' The lower court excluded
the testimony of Dr. Holiday concluding that there had been no
waiver of the physician-patient privilege since Dr. Holiday's treat-
ment of the patient was not interrelated with that of the other
doctors who had testified. Reversing the lower court's decision the
Supreme Court of Indiana held that if a patient by way of complaint,
counterclaim, or affirmative defense, places in issue his physical
or mental condition, then he automatically waives the privilege grant-
ed by the statute as to all matters causally or historically related
38. Ch. 1160, § 1, [1945] Cal. Stats. 2208.
39. Ch. 1042, § 1, [1947] Cal. Stats. 2443.
1. The statute containing the physician-patient privilege Is IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714
(1987).
